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Comments
SAME INJURY, DIFFERENT COVERAGE: HOW PRIVATIZED
INSURANCE POLICIES AFFECT INJURED ELITE AND
NON-ELITE PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 1, 1999, former New Jersey Net Jayson Williams
charged down the court like he did every night.' Williams, a
recent NBA (National Basketball Association) All-Star, played
that game against the Atlanta Hawks 2 with his notorious inten-
sity.3 With one minute left to play, 4 Williams collided with team-
mate Stephon Marbury5 and squirmed in anguish on the
1. SeeJon Heyman, Jayson Hoping for His Biggest Rebound, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Oct.
3, 2004, at B18 (reporting Williams broke his leg April Fools Day 1999).
2. See Williams'Health Could Affect Draft Pick, KNEEI.COM, 10 (une 22, 2000),
http://www.kneel.com/news/mainstory-pf.cfm?newsarticle-96 (mentioning At-
lanta Hawks as team New Jersey Nets faced night Williams injured his knee).
3. See Mike Puma, Williams Offensive on Glass, off Court, ESPN CxSSIC SPORT-
SCENTURY BIoGRAPHY, 10-12, http://espn.go.com/classic/biography/s/Williams
_.Jayson.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2005) (describing Williams's tumultuous life on
and off court).
In January 2003, Williams had settled a wrongful death lawsuit filed
by Christofi's family. He agreed to pay $2.75 million, The (Newark) Star-
Ledger reported.
In his nine seasons with the Philadelphia 76ers and NewJersey Nets,
the 6-foot-10, 245-pound Williams was recognized for his work on the
boards. In the 1997-98 season, when he made his only All-Star team, his
13.6 rebounds per game ranked second in the NBA.
But just as Williams' career had begun to blossom, it ended. A little
more than two months after signing an $86-million, six-year contract ex-
tension with the Nets, he suffered a broken leg and injured his knee dur-
ing a collision with teammate Stephon Marbury on April 1, 1999. He
would never play again in the NBA. He announced his retirement in
2000, finishing with career averages of 7.3 points and 7.5 rebounds.
Id.
4. See On the Court: A Decade of Ups and Downs for an NBA All-Star, 3,
http://www.courttv.com/graphics/trials/jayson-williams/timeline/timeline.swf
(follow "1998-99" hyperlink) (last visitedJuly 30, 2005) [hereinafter On the Court]
(reporting approximate time of Williams's then season-ending injury).
5. See NBA.com Bio: Stephon Marbury Bio, http://www.nba.com/playerfile/
stephon-marbury/index.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2005) (listing Marbury's career
statistics and professional accomplishments). Marbury has played for the Minne-
sota Timberwolves (1996-1999), NewJersey Nets (1999-2001), Phoenix Suns (2001-
2004), and New York Knicks (2004-present). See id. He was a "two-time NBA All-
Star (2001, '03)," and "[a]long with Oscar Robertson, is the only player in NBA
history with career averages of 20 points (20.5) and 8.0 assists (8.2) and Robertson
had 25.7 ppg, 9.5 apg." Id. He was "[n]amed NBA Rookie of the Month forJanu-
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floor.6 Unfortunately, the collision broke Williams's right leg and
ruptured his knee. 7 He worked feverishly with trainers and doctors
to rehabilitate and come back to the NBA.8 Nevertheless, on June
28, 2000, after fourteen months and one further injury,9 Jayson Wil-
liams officially retired from the NBA. 10
ary 1997, averaging 16.9 points, 8.1 assists and 1.10 steals per game," and "[n]amed
Third Team All-America by the AP [Associate Press] after his first and only season
at Georgia Tech." Id. He "[w]as named to the Atlantic Coast Conference First
Team and ACC Rookie of the Year." Id.
6. See Puma, supra note 3, 13 (discussing disastrous effect of injury on ca-
reer, but reporting Williams's overall charisma and optimism).
Off the court, Williams made people laugh. A regular on the radio
and television talk-show circuit, he released his autobiography Loose Balls
in 2000 and it became a New York Times Bestseller.
"When I'm retired, I want people to say, 'That's a good man,"' Wil-
liams wrote. "Even the ones who say, 'Isn't that the guy who used to be so
wild, who used to be drinking and fighting so much, who was always get-
ting in trouble?'"
Id.
7. See Darren Rovell, Insurance Companies Could Seek Repayment, 5 (Jan. 13,
2005) http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=1966345&type=story (discussing
Jayson Williams's current plan to return to professional basketball amidst his per-
sonal and legal problems). "Jayson Williams, trying to put a manslaughter trial and
early retirement behind him, played nine minutes with the Idaho Stampede of the
CBA [Continental Basketball Association] on Wednesday night. It was his first
step, he said, in preparing for a possible comeback to the NBA." Id. 1 1.
8. See On the Court, supra note 4, 2, (follow "1999-2000" hyperlink) (last
visited July 30, 2005) (reporting Williams's love for professional basketball and de-
termination to play).
[On] June 28, 2000 - Williams formally announces his retirement
after 10 injury-plagued seasons.
"This has been a hard choice for me," Williams said in a written state-
ment. "I loved playing basketball, I loved being a Net, and I loved the
fans in New Jersey. But I know from the pain in my knee and what my
physicians have told me that my injuries won't allow me to return."
In addition to leaving a hole in the Nets starting line-up, Williams
took a hunk out of the team's pocketbook: a four year, $59.6 million
salary the Nets were required to pay.
Id. 11 4-6.
9. See id. (reminding readers of Williams's subsequent injury that expedited
his early retirement).
After missing much of the regular season recovering from leg sur-
gery, Williams breaks a toe on his left foot during his first full team
practice.
"The doctors told me I'll be out three months with this, so I figure
I'll be walking around in three weeks," Williams told the New York Post as
he prepared for toe surgery. "I love the game. I want to play again. I will
play again."
Id. 7 1-2.
10. See Heyman, supra note 1, at B18 (discussing Williams's career-ending in-
jury and how four years later, Williams desires to return to professional basketball).
Jayson Williams is telling friends he plans to make a comeback with the Dallas
Mavericks. Maybe Mark Cuban will be his benefactor. It's been four years since
Williams announced his retirement 14 months after breaking his leg April 1,
1999." Id.
[Vol. 13: p. 133
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After the knee injury ended his NBA career," Williams's com-
pensation took center court. Prior to the injury, Williams had
signed a six-year $86 million contract with the New Jersey Nets.12
As an elite professional athlete suffering a career-ending injury,
what were Williams's options? 13 Could he sue Stephon Marbury,
the other player involved in the collision? 14 Could he rely on Work-
ers' Compensation Statutes? 15 Could he solely depend on the
NBA's Collective Bargaining Agreement's ("CBA") disability insur-
ance provisions? 16 Could he just rely on the insurance policy the
Nets purchased on his guaranteed contract?17 What if Williams had
been a first year player earning the NBA minimum?1 8 Would he
have had the same options as a non-elite or inexperienced player?1 9
Considering the likelihood of injury for a professional ath-
lete, 20 it is important to consider the available options upon injury
11. See Fallen NBA Star Jayson Williams Makes Debut with Idaho of CBA, 4
(Jan. 13, 2005), http://www.allsports.com/cgi-bin/showstory.cgi?story-id=52581
(discussing how Williams is now attempting to come back to semi-professional bas-
ketball in Continental Basketball Association). "The 36-year-old Williams had not
played since suffering a serious knee injury while with the New Jersey Nets during
the lockout-shortened 1998-99 season. He averaged 7.3 points and 7.5 rebounds
in nine seasons with the Nets and Philadelphia 76ers, making the All-Star team in
1998." Id.
12. See Rovell, supra note 7, 4 (reporting value of Williams's contract).
13. For a discussion and analysis of compensation options available to Wil-
liams if Williams were non-elite and inexperienced athlete, see infra notes 158-200
and accompanying text.
14. See Erica K Rosenthal, Note, Inside the Lines: Basing Negligence Liability in
Spoirs for Safety-Based Rule Violations on the Level of Play, 72 FORnHAM L. REv. 2631,
2647-48 (2004) (examining and analyzing negligence liability in both professional
and amateur sports).
15. SeeJohn Redlingshafer, Comment, Tonight's Matchup - Workers' Compensa-
tion v. Medical Malpractice: What Should Lower-Paid, Inexperienced Athletes Receive When
a Team Doctor Allegedly Aids in Ending Their Careers?, 2 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 100, 101 (2004) (discussing workers' compensation as futile resource
for professional athletes).
16. See Teresa Herbert, Are Player Injuries Adequately Compensated?, 7 SPORTS
LAw. J. 243, 246-62 (2000) (questioning whether CBAs could adequately protect
and compensate professional athletes upon severe injury).
17. See Redlingshafer, supra note 15, at 124 (describing disability insurance as
very expensive and inferring elite professional athletes are more likely and able to
insure relative to inexperienced and non-elite professional athletes).
18. See Exhibit C: Minimum Annual Salary Scale, at C-1, http://www.nbpa.
com/downloads/CBA.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2005) (listing $350,000 as mini-
mum salary for professional athlete with one year of service in NBA during 1998-99
season). The 1998-99 minimum is used because this represents Williams's last full
season.
19. For a discussion of the discrepancy in insurance options between elite and
non-elite, inexperienced professional athletes, see infra notes 142-53, 189-200, and
accompanying text.
20. See Dean Richardson, Player Violence: An Essay on Torts and Sports, 15 STAN.
L. & POL'Y Rrv. 133, 133-34 (2004) (listing several injuries among professional
2006]
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and how these options affect athletes of different earning capaci-
ties. 2' Fortunately for Jayson Williams, the New Jersey Nets had
insured his $86 million contract.22 The insurance carrier 23 paid
the New Jersey Nets enabling the Nets to pay the remainder of
Williams's contract. 24 Like the Nets team owners, professional
athletes and commenting on significant likelihood of injury while participating in
sports).
A random sampling of sports news for the weekend of August 2 to August
4, 2003, revealed injuries that ranged from the expected to the bizarre
and from the unfortunate to the tragic. During a preseason scrimmage,
Seattle Seahawks free safety Damien Robinson separated his shoulder
when he made a low drive to break up a pass. Arizona Cardinals tackle
Leonard Davis broke his thumb during practice while engaged in a
fistfight with teammates. Kansas City Chiefs receiver Dameane Douglas
injured his knee and would be unable to practice for six weeks after Min-
nesota Vikings cornerback Rushen Jones threw him to the ground during
a joint practice. . . . For the risk averse, the oft-quoted words of Judge
Cardozo provide apt advice: "the timorous may stay at home."
Id. at 133-34 (footnotes omitted).
21. For a discussion examining different options through available statutory
and common law scheme, see infra notes 31-88 and accompanying text.
22. See Heyman, supra note 1, at B18 (mentioning Williams's insurance).
"Williams is telling folks the insurance on his $86 million contract expires in the
coming weeks, so he wouldn't have to repay the insurance company . I..." d. ; see
also Bob Considine, Jayson Williams Attempts Comeback with the CBA, USA To-
DAY.COM, 11 (Jan. 10, 2005), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/basketball/cba/
2005-01-10jwilliams-cba x.htm?csp=34 (discussing details of Williams's insurance
issues and their potential implications).
An insurance company - the BWD Group - paid most of what Wil-
liams had remaining on his 6-year, $86 million contract after he retired in
2000. That payout was believed to have provisions that prohibited him
from playing again without financial penalty.
Joseph Hayden, an attorney for Williams, did not return a call on
Monday. Nets president Rod Thorn, who took over for Nash in 2000,
said he was unsure of the insurance implications for Williams in an NBA
comeback. But a source close to Williams said that those legal concerns
were a "non-issue."
Considine, supra 11-12.
23. See Rovell, supra note 7, 8 (discussing different insurance groups be-
lieved to be involved with Williams's contract). Speculated insurance companies
are BWD Group and ASU International. See id. (announcing different insurance
companies involved in Nets contract with Williams).
24. See id. 6 (foreshadowing and speculating parties' current concerns).
[N]ets general manager Rod Thorn told USA Today that he was un-
sure of the insurance implications of Williams' comeback. Nets execu-
tives did not return a call seeking comment...
Executives with the insurance companies believed to be involved
with Williams' policy, BWD Group and ASU International, declined
comment.
Williams' former agent and attorney Sal DiFazio, who negotiated Wil-
liams' contract with the Nets, said that Williams will owe nothing if he
makes it back to the NBA. DiFazio said one of the insurance companies
involved believed that Williams' injury was not career-ending. After their
doctor said he believed Williams was healthy and a doctor chosen by Wil-
liams' representation said the former center was badly injured, the case
[Vol. 13: p. 133
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athletes and entertainers have taken similar precautionary mea-
sures.
25
This Comment examines options available to professional ath-
letes when injury threatens their careers including Negligence
Claims, 26 Workers' Compensation Statutes,27 and Collective and In-
dividual negotiated contract terms. 28 After evaluating these op-
tions, this Comment discusses whether private disability insurance is
a professional athlete's best choice. 29 Further, this Comment ex-
plores the limited options available to non-elite and inexperienced
professional athletes who cannot afford or attract privatized
insurance.30
II. BACKGROUND
A. Professional Athletes' Negligence Claims
When injured, the injured person can usually sue the person
who caused the injury.3' This option, however, may be unrealistic
for injured professional athletes.32 Besides prevailing over tort
went to arbitration in the fall of last year. DiFazio said Williams prevailed
and the insurance company's window to appeal has already expired.
"They had their bite of the apple," said DiFazio, who resigned as an
NBA agent in 2000. "And I don't think they get a second bite." .
Insurance industry insiders said they would be surprised if Williams
could make a full recovery and not have to make any payments.
Id. 7-10, 14.
25. See Richard Hynes, Non-Procrustean Bankruptcy, 2004 U. ILL. L. REv. 301,
332 (2004) (commenting several entertainers and professional athletes have
sought additional insurance to protect themselves in anticipation of injuries).
26. For further discussion on negligence suits in the sports arena, see infra
notes 31-63.
27. For further discussion on workers' compensation statutes, see infra notes
64-79; for specific discussion on Pennsylvania's Workers' Compensation Statute
and corresponding case law, see infra notes 80-116.
28. For further discussion on professional sports unions and their collective
bargaining agreements, see infra notes 122-42.
29. For further discussion examining professional athletes' best options when
severely injured, see infra notes 142-53 and accompanying text.
30. For further discussion analyzing and comparing non-elite professional
athletes' options, see infra notes 158-200.
31. See generally FRANKJ. VANDALL ET AL., TORTS: CASES AND PROBLEMS § 12 (2d
ed. 2003) (educating readers of potential tort lawsuits in different situations).
32. See Darryll M. Halcomb Lewis, An Analysis of Brown v. National Football
League, 9 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 263, 265 (2002) (discussing application of tort
law to professional sports and effects of different tort doctrines); Richardson, supra
note 20, at 133-34 (summarizing and analyzing sports related injuries and high
frequency of injuries in professional sports); Rosenthal, supra note 14, at 2647-54
(describing courts' approaches to sports related injuries and policy considerations
for each approach).
20061
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law's complexities in the sports arena,33 a professional athlete
would also have to overcome unique social stigmas.3 4 Courts have
generally been unsympathetic to athletes, on a professional or ama-
teur level, who suffer injuries while participating in sports.35 The
following cases demonstrate the most prevalent tort doctrines ap-
plied to sports injury cases.36
33. For further discussion describing application of tort law in professional
sports and effects on individual players, see infra notes 158-66 and accompanying
text.
34. See Rosenthal, supra note 14, at 2631-32 (alluding that suing in sports set-
ting carries social stigma).
Sports participants often suffer physical injuries, and some may look to
the civil torts system to recover for their harms. Many may not, however,
because in the sports arena players are encouraged to "toughen up," be
"macho," and forego their right to sue. Thus, a disconnect exists between
the legal system of tort liability and the sports world.
Id. at 2632 (footnotes omitted); see also Memorable Quotes from A League of Their
Own, 38, http://us.imdb.com/title/tt0104694/quotes (last visited July 26, 2005)
(parodying need to remain stoic while playing sports especially on professional
level). Jimmy Dugan, manager of the All-American Girls Baseball Team Rockford
Peaches, has just scolded Evelyn Gardner, Rockford Peach outfielder, for making a
fielding error. She begins to cry.
JIMMY DUGAN [in agitated voice]: Are you crying? Are you crying? ARE
YOU CRYING? There's no crying, there's no crying in baseball. Rogers
Hornsby was my manager, and he called me a talking pile of [garbage].
And that was when my parents drove all the way down from Michigan to
see me play the game. And did I cry? NO. NO. And do you know why?
EVELYN GARDNER [sobbing]: No, no, no.
JIMMY DUGAN: Because there's no crying in baseball.
Memorable Quotes from A League of Their Own, supra, 38.
35. See Rosenthal, supra note 14, at 2647 (noting courts recognize three differ-
ent theories of recovery in sports injury cases: intent, recklessness, and negli-
gence). Public policy considerations lead to courts requiring a more intense
standard for voluntary sports participants. See id. at 2661-62 (discussing public pol-
icy issues in sports). "Courts consider broad policy concerns when determining
the appropriate standard in sports injury cases. Many courts stress the importance
of maintaining vigorous participation and avoiding a flood of litigation. Courts
and commentators also have stated the importance of other public policy concerns
that should be addressed." Id. at 2662 (footnotes omitted). Rosenthal further ex-
amines the public policy discussion among courts and commentators:
Courts and commentators have mentioned the importance of consider-
ing various public policy considerations when determining the appropri-
ate standard, including economic consequences, the participant's
purpose of playing, the experience level and age of the participants, the
impact of role models on younger players, and the importance of main-
taining competition.
Several commentators have asserted that the economic circum-
stances of a participant is a significant factor that may affect the standard
that is used. Such financial considerations include the participant's earn-
ing of a salary or insurance coverage, as well as the financial impact that a
potential injury may have on the participant.
Id. at 2659-60 (footnotes omitted).
36. For further discussion of main sports injuries cases and ability to recover
under tort law, see infra notes 37-63 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 13: p. 133
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i. Recklessness Standard
In Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc.,37 Denver Bronco Defen-
sive Back Dale Hackbart 38 sued Running Back Charles "Booby"
Clark3 9 and the Cincinnati Bengals for injuries resulting from
Clark's hit.40 Hackbart argued Clark's hit was reckless, and alterna-
tively, negligent.41 Despite evidence of Clark's illegal hit, Hackbart
still lost the case. 42 In dismissing the charges, Federal District Court
Judge Richard Matsch rejected Hackbart's arguments of reckless-
ness and negligence because both theories relied on "determining
what a reasonable professional football player in Booby Clark's posi-
37. 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979).
38. See id. at 518 (describing Hackbart's role with Denver Broncos). In 1973,
at the time of the injury, Hackbart was a thirteen-year veteran and a "free safety
position on the Broncos' defensive team." Hackbart v. Cincinatti Bengals, Inc.,
435 F. Supp. 352, 353 (D. Colo. 1977), rev'd, 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979).
39. See Hackbart, 601 F.2d at 519 (discussing Clark's overall role with Cincin-
nati Bengals and particular position at time of incident). Clark was the Bengals'
offensive back and "just before the injury he had run a pass pattern to the right
side of the Denver Broncos' end zone." Id.
40. See id. at 520 (summarizing Hackbart's theory of relief); Richardson, supra
note 20, at 139-40 (presenting relevant background information about Hackbart's
case).
41. See Richardson, supra note 20, at 139 ("Dale Hackbart sued both Booby
Clark and the Cincinnati Bengals seeking compensation for the damages caused
by Clark's blow; his primary theory of recovery was Clark's alleged recklessness,
although negligence was asserted as an alternative basis for his claim.").
42. See id. at 139-40 (paraphrasing federal district court's rationale). "The
federal district court entered judgment for defendants, finding that the judiciary
could not be expected to control the violence in professional football." Id; see also
Hackbart, 601 F.2d at 519 (reporting details leading to Hackbart's injury).
Clark was an offensive back and just before the injury he had run a
pass pattern to the right side of the Denver Broncos' end zone. The in-
jury flowed indirectly from this play. The pass was intercepted by Billy
Thompson, a Denver free safety, who returned it to mid-field. The sub-
ject injury occurred as an aftermath of the pass play.
As a consequence of the interception, the roles of Hackbart and
Clark suddenly changed. Hackbart, who had been defending, instantane-
ously became an offensive player. Clark, on the other hand, became a
defensive player. Acting as an offensive player, Hackbart attempted to
block Clark by throwing his body in front of him. He thereafter re-
mained on the ground. He turned, and with one knee on the ground,
watched the play following the interception.
The trial court's finding was that Charles Clark, "acting out of anger
and frustration, but without a specific intent to injure * * * stepped for-
ward and struck a blow with his right forearm to the back of the kneeling
plaintiff's head and neck with sufficient force to cause both players to fall
forward to the ground." Both players, without complaining to the offi-
cials or to one another, returned to their respective sidelines since the
ball had changed hands and the offensive and defensive teams of each
had been substituted. Clark testified at trial that his frustration was
brought about by the fact that his team was losing the game.
Hackbart, 601 F.2d at 519.
2006]
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tion would be expected to do. ' 43 After considering Hackbart's
brute size and experience compared to Clark's, 44 Clark's feeling of
desperation at the time of hit,45 and the nature of professional foot-
ball in general,46Judge Matsch decided Clark's actions were reason-
able given the circumstances. 47
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge William
E. Doyle reversed, deciding Hackbart deserved "a trial on the merits
to determine whether Clark recklessly disregarded his safety when
the fateful blow was struck."'48 Even though he won the appeal,
43. Richardson, supra note 20, at 142 (analyzing Judge Matsch's approach to
Hackbart's proposed liability theories). "[I] t is wholly incongruous to talk about a
professional football player's duty of care for the safety of opposing players when
he has been trained and motivated to be heedless of injury to himself." Id. (citing
Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 352, 356 (D. Colo. 1977), rev'd,
601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979)).
44. See id. at 140 (differentiating size and experience between Hackbart and
Clark).
The opinion emphasizes Hackbart's size (six feet three inches tall
and 210 pounds) and his experience as a seasoned veteran (thirty-five
years old with twenty-one years of experience in organized football, thir-
teen as a professional). Although his opinion did not mention it, Judge
Matsch admitted into evidence incidents designed to show that Hackbart
was a dirty player. In contrast, the opinion stresses Clark's youth and in-
experience; he was a twenty-three-year-old rookie playing in his first regu-
lar season game. His size (six feet one and three-quarter inches tall and
240 pounds) likewise was mentioned.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
45. See id. (reminding readers, at time of hit, Clark and Bengals were losing
21-3 and Broncos had just intercepted). "In anger and frustration but without
intent to injure, Clark threw a forearm against the back of Hackbart's helmeted
head with sufficient force to cause both players to fall forward to the ground." Id.
46. See id. at 141 (characterizing football as inherently violent and part of
game's atmosphere). "Players are urged by their coaches to play with reckless
abandonment of self-protective instincts and with controlled rage." Id.
47. See id. (describing rationale and application of law).
The trial court's opinion described the commercial context of the
game as a necessary interpretive backdrop for plaintiffs claim. The abil-
ity to control the teams, players, and the terms and conditions of employ-
ment via the NFL constitution and bylaws as well as via the collective
bargaining agreement between the League and the Players Association
were all part of the trial court's initial observations. Judge Matsch then
focused upon the game itself. He saw the most obvious characteristic of
the game as the violent physical collisions between the bodies of players
in contest for territory ..... Violence on the field is orchestrated care-
fully. Players are urged by their coaches to play with reckless abandon-
ment of self-protective instincts with controlled rage.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
48. Richardson, supra note 20, at 143. Richardson compares the two deci-
sions as follows:
Circuit CourtJudge Doyle's opinion is markedly different from that
of Judge Matsch. The characteristics of the parties were not discussed.
The description of the violent incident was perfunctory. The discussion
of the professional football industry came in a few short, conclusory
8
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Hackbart still had to surpass a semi-heightened standard of liabil-
ity.49 Although Judge Doyle reversed Judge Matsch, Matsch's
thoughts regarding the similarity between negligence and reckless
behavior on the football field lurk on the sidelines and remain to-
day.50 Amidst the huddle of uncertainty, in both professional and
amateur contact sports, Hackbart establishes: "(1) negligence can-
not form the basis for a tort claim by an injured player against an-
other participant who caused the injury, but (2) either recklessness
or intentional wrongdoing can form the basis of such a claim."5 1
Courts today, however, remain torn between Matsch's simple negli-
gence approach and Doyle's recklessness and intent approach.
52
paragraphs that recited the NFL rule prohibiting players from striking
the head of another with the forearm and referred to the customs of the
game. The reference to custom is unclear. Judge Doyle asserted that
football's general customs do not approve the intentional punching or
striking of others. Of course, the intentional striking of another - block-
ing, tackling and running over a tackler - is the very essence of this game
of violent collisions. Judge Doyle stated that the general custom prohibit-
ing the striking of a player from behind was supported by the witness
testimony. Judge Matsch had found the testimony unconvincing in light
of the response to the blow by Hackbart during the game and by those
who viewed it in the game films. Judge Doyle disagreed with Judge
Matsch's notion that the NFL had abandoned all reason and argued that
the cited rule was intended to establish reasonable safety boundaries.
Id. at 143-44 (footnotes omitted).
49. See id. at 144 (reporting appeal's effect now requires proof of recklessness
or intent).
50. See id. (ponderingJudge Matsch's concerns). "But, isJudge Doyle correct
that recklessness is a workable standard, or is Judge Matsch's view that negligence
and reckless behavior on the football field are virtually indistinguishable more ac-
curate?" Id.
51. Id. at 145.
52. See id. at 144-47 (describing different jurisdictions' interpretations of
Hackbart). Richardson comments that in Lestina v. West Bend Mutual Insurance Co.,
501 N.W.2d 28, 33 (Wis. 1993), "the [Wisconsin] court carefully considered the
post-Hackbart judicial trend toward adopting a recklessness standard. It rejected
that standard in favor of negligence because the negligence standard can subsume
all the factors and considerations presented by ... contact sports and is sufficiently
flexible to permit ... vigorous competition ...." Id. at 145 (internal quotations
omitted) (alteration in original). See also Turcotte v. Fell, 502 N.E.2d 964, 969
(N.Y. 1986) (" [A] professional athlete is more aware of the dangers of the activity,
and presumably more willing to accept them in exchange for salary, than is an
amateur."); Crawn v. Campo, 643 A.2d 600, 601 (NJ. 1994) (upholding and en-
forcing requirement of recklessness to prove liability of tortfeasors in sports).
"New Jersey is averse to tort immunities. It strongly endorses a standard of care
based on ordinary negligence and tolerates immunities only in exceptional situa-
tions for important public policy reasons." Richardson, supra note 20, at 149.
2006]
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ii. Assumption of Risk Doctrine
In Knight v. Jewett,53 Plaintiff Kendra Knight sued Defendant
Michael Jewett for permanently injuring her finger during a touch
football game. 54 Before being injured, Knight asked Jewett "not to
play so rough" and warned if he continued she would stop play-
ing.55 Knight's injury required multiple surgeries, but all surgeries
failed to restore the movement in her finger.5 6 The California Su-
preme Court decided against Knight concluding "that with the
adoption of comparative fault, it is necessary to distinguish between
the different types of assumption of the risk."'5 7 The court further
decided that depending on the activity's inherent danger, a partici-
pant could implicitly assume the activity's risks.58 "Thus, a partici-
pant is not in breach of a legal duty by engaging in merely
negligent behavior because primary assumption of risk operates to
lower the duty of care that participants owe to each other from or-
dinary negligence to recklessness.."59
53. 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992).
54. See id. at 697 (recounting facts behind lawsuit).
On January 25, 1987, the day of the 1987 Super Bowl football game,
plaintiff Kendra Knight and defendant Michael Jewett, together with a
number of other social acquaintances, attended a Super Bowl party at the
home of a mutual friend. During half time of the Super Bowl, several
guests decided to play an informal game of touch football on an adjoin-
ing dirt lot, using a "peewee" football. Each team had four or five players
and included both women and men; plaintiff and defendant were on op-
posing teams. No rules were explicitly discussed before the game.
Five to ten minutes into the game, defendant ran into plaintiff dur-
ing a play. According to plaintiff, at that point she told defendant "not to
play so rough or I was going to have to stop playing." Her declaration
stated that "[defendant] seemed to acknowledge my statement and left
me with the impression that he would play less rough prospectively." In
his deposition, defendant recalled that plaintiff had asked him to "be
careful," but did not remember plaintiff saying that she would stop
playing.
Id. (alteration in original).
55. Id.; see also Rosenthal, supra note 14, at 2650 (summarizing plaintiff s plea
to defendant to cease rough play).
56. See Knight, 834 P.2d. at 698 (describing plaintiff's injury and disastrous
effects).
57. Rosenthal, supra note 14, at 2650-51.
58. See id. at 2651 (summarizing Knight holding and explaining assumption of
risk theory).
[A] participant in an active sport breaches a legal duty of care to
other participants - i.e., engages in conduct that properly may subject
him or her to financial liability - only if the participant intentionally in-
jures another player or engages in conduct that is so reckless as to be
totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport.
Id. (quoting Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 711 (Cal. 1992)).
59. Id. (citation omitted); see also Knight, 834 P.2d at 707-08 (summarizing
California Supreme Court's rationale and implications thus far in opinion).
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iii. Different Jurisdictions
There is a discrepancy as to which standard applies to sports
injury cases even among states within the same circuit.60 Within the
Third Circuit, New Jersey requires recklessness. 61 But just across
the Benjamin Franklin Bridge, Pennsylvania applies the assumption
of risk doctrine. 62 Regardless of the applicable torts doctrine, a
professional athlete's negligence suit may fall on deaf ears given the
available alternatives. 63
B. Workers' Compensation Statutes
After examining negligence case law in the realm of sports-re-
lated injuries, it is equally important to evaluate the current statu-
tory recourse for injured professional athletes. 64 Analyzing both
the available legal and statutory options helps determine the neces-
sity behind proactive action and protection. 65 Workers' Compensa-
tion Statutes ("WCS") provide the necessary statutory recourse for
In cases involving "primary assumption of risk" - where, by virtue of the
nature of the activity and the parties' relationship to the activity, the de-
fendant owes no legal duty to protect the plaintiff from the particular risk
of harm that caused the injury - the doctrine continues to operate as a
complete bar to the plaintiffs recovery. In cases involving "secondary as-
sumption of risk" - where the defendant does owe a duty of care to the
plaintiff, but the plaintiff proceeds to encounter a known risk imposed by
the defendant's breach of duty - the doctrine is merged into the compar-
ative fault scheme, and the trier of fact, in apportioning the loss resulting
from the injury, may consider the relative responsibility of the parties.
Id.
60. For a discussion of New Jersey's and Pennsylvania's approaches, see infra
notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
61. See Crawn v. Campo, 643 A.2d 600, 601 (NJ. 1994) (upholding and en-
forcing recklessness requirement against sport tortfeasors). "New Jersey is averse
to tort immunities. It strongly endorses a standard of care based on ordinary negli-
gence and tolerates immunities only in exceptional situations for important public
policy reasons." Richardson, supra note 20, at 149.
62. See Bowser v. Hershey Baseball Ass'n, 516 A.2d 61, 63-64 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1986) (recognizing Pennsylvania's assumption of risk doctrine).
63. See Redlingshafer, supra note 15, at 100 (generalizing society's lack of sym-
pathy for injured professional athletes given their perceived lucrative salaries). For
an analysis of the recklessness standard and the assumption of risk doctrine as
applied to facts surrounding Jayson Williams's injury, see infra notes 158-66 and
accompanying text.
64. For a further discussion on Workers' Compensation Statutes as more of a
remedy for non-professional athletes, see infra notes 67-79.
65. For a further discussion and analysis on Sports Unions' negotiations for
disability insurance premiums and individual professional athletes' ability to nego-
tiate for privatized disability insurance options in team contracts, see infra notes
121-42.
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injured employees. 66 Generally, legislatures enacted these laws to
protect employees and to "obligate employers to pay for employee
injuries, regardless of fault, by contracting with private insurance
carriers or paying premiums to state workers' compensation
funds."67 States enact their own WCS, but most classify the benefits
under four categories: temporary disability benefits, permanent dis-
ability benefits, medical benefits, and death benefits. 68
For professional athletes, WCS present a bit of a curveball. 69
Generally, states have chosen one of five approaches when con-
fronted with professional athletes and WCS: statutory exclusion
method, functional exclusion method, exclusion through case-law
method, election method, and set-off method. 70 Currently, about
sixteen states71 exclude professional athletes in some way.72 Some
66. For a definition of Workers' Compensation Statutes, see infra note 67 and
accompanying text.
67. Rachel Schaffer, Comment, Grabbing Them by the Balls: Legislatures, Courts,
and Team Owners Bar Non-Elite Professional Athletes from Workers' Compensation, 8 AM.
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 623, 636 (2000) (referencing ARTHUR LARSON, LAR-
SON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAw § 1, at 1-1 (1997)). "Generally, to obtain
workers' compensation benefits, individuals must be 'employees' instead of 'inde-
pendent contractors,' and their injuries must be work-related." Id. at 637 (foot-
note omitted).
68. See id. at 638 (describing different categories states consider when enact-
ing WCS). Schaffer describes the four different categories as follows:
Temporary disability benefits are for short-term injuries that prevent
an employee from working but anticipate an employee's return to work
after full recovery .... Usually, the temporary benefit provides for two-
thirds of an injured worker's regular earnings.
Permanent disability benefits cover permanent partial disabilities
and permanent total disabilities. Permanent disability benefit schemes
compensate permanent physical impairment, limitation, or loss of earn-
ing capacity for injured employees .... There are inherent differences
between temporary disability benefits and permanent disability benefits,
however; whereas permanent disability benefits indemnify against future
loss of bodily functions and wage earning capacity, temporary disability
benefits only compensate current income loss.
Medical benefits pay for all medical expenses related to an em-
ployee's injury. Usually, medical benefits are unlimited because they as-
sist in recovery. Death benefits . . . provide for fatal injuries or diseases.
Death benefits usually cover burial and survival costs.
Id. at 638-39 (footnotes omitted).
69. See id. at 639 ("State workers' compensation statutes apply to professional
athletes in a different manner than other employees.").
70. See id. (listing different states' approaches to professional athletes and
workers' compensation statutes from most to least restrictive).
71. See id. at 639-42 (listing states and summarizing their approaches). These
states are Florida, Massachusetts, Wyoming, Alabama, Rhode Island, Washington,
Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, Vermont, and West Virginia. See id.
72. See Schaffer, supra note 67, at 640-41 (explaining statutory exclusion of
professional athletes ranges from complete exclusion to exclusion conditioned
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states include professional athletes, "but functionally exclude them
from such benefits." 73 Other states do not explicitly mention pro-
fessional athletes in their WCS,7M but their courts have interpreted
this silence as exclusion.7 5  Other states employ the election
method, 76 which grants team owners the option to participate, in-
stead of requiring their participation, as they do of other employ-
ers.77 Under the set-off method, "workers' compensation benefits
are subtracted from any benefits paid under contract and team
owners receive a credit to avoid doubly compensating professional
athletes.'78 This method still poses problems for professional ath-
letes who are permanently injured. 79
upon injuries obtained in successive seasons). Florida, Massachusetts, and Wyo-
ming exclude professional athletes from WCS completely. See id. Rhode Island
and Washington only exclude certain professional athletes: Rhode Island excludes
professional hockey players, and Washington excludes horse racejockeys. See id. at
641. Alabama, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Ne-
braska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Vermont, and West Virginia all exclude pro-
fessional athletes who have injured themselves in two successive seasons including
"off-season or preseason." Id.
73. Id. at 642. "Iowa, for example, does not allow professional athletes to fully
recover their lost salary for permanent disabilities." Id. "Similarly, Louisiana's
workers' compensation provision covers professional athletes but creates a set-off
scheme of workers' compensation benefits." Id.
74. See id. at 643 (explaining Missouri and Maryland do not explicitly mention
professional athletes in their WCS).
75. See id. at 64243 (discussing supporting case law in both jurisdictions).
In Palmer v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, a Missouri court rejected a
claim for workers' compensation benefits by a football player. The court
concluded that the deliberate collision of bodies did not constitute an
"injury" under Missouri's definition of workers' compensation, and that
Palmer's injury was "not an unexpected occupational event." Therefore,
Palmer could not receive workers' compensation benefits for his injuries.
Similarly, a Maryland court in Rowe v. Baltimore Colts held that an occupa-
tion such as football, which requires physical contact, cannot give rise to
"accidental injur[ies]" under the Maryland Workmen's Compensation
Law.
Id. at 643 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
76. See id. at 644 (exemplifying Illinois and Minnesota as such states). Minne-
sota is a bit more progressive, in the sense that "both the professional athletes and
the employers decidejointly whether to forgo workers' compensation benefits and
instead opt for players' contracts." Id.
77. See Schaffer, supra note 67, at 644. ("For example, in Illinois, an employer
has a choice of whether to participate in the state's workers' compensation pro-
gram. If team owners choose not to participate in the state's workers' compensa-
tion programs, professional athletes must rely on their contracts for benefits.").
78. Id. at 645 (footnote omitted).
79. See id. at 645-46 (determining professional athletes with permanent inju-
ries cannot sufficiently rely on set-off method WCS).
In such situations, professional athletes need workers' compensation ben-
efits because they are not being compensated for any period during their
employment, but are being compensated prospectively for the period af-
ter their employment terminates. Professional athletes who are perma-
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i. Scouting Report on Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Statute:
A Closer Look at a Set-Off Method's Workers' Compensation Statute
Among the five types of WCS, the set-off method is the most
inclusive of professional athletes.8 0 One has a better understand-
ing of a statute's limits, however, by analyzing its language and rele-
vant case law.8 Pennsylvania's Workers' Compensation Statute
("PAWC") is best described as a set-off method statute.8 2 By
employing a broad definition of "employer, '8 3 "employe [sic]" '8 4
and "employer's liability,"8 5 the statute includes professional
nently injured, therefore, need both workers' compensation benefits and
their remaining contractual benefits in order to compensate for their fu-
ture physical - and therefore occupational - inabilities.
Id.
80. For a discussion of the different categories of WCS, see supra notes 69-79.
81. For an analysis of Pennsylvania's Workers' Compensation Statute, and its
case law, see infra notes 82-116 and accompanying text.
82. See Stewart E. Niles,Jr. & Roderick K. West, In Whose Interest? The Return of
the Injured Athlete to Competition, 25 BRIEF 8, 11 (Spring 1996) (discussing PAWC and
its provisions).
83. 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 21 (West 2005) (defining employer within stat-
ute). "The term 'employer,' as used in this act, is declared to be synonymous with
master, and to include natural persons, partnerships, joint-stock companies, corpo-
rations for profit, corporations not for profit, municipal corporations, the Com-
monwealth, and all governmental agencies created by it." Id; see also Reasner v.
Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd., 387 A.2d 679, 681 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978) (estab-
lishing relationship Pennsylvania courts seek when determining application of
workers' compensation statutes). In Reasner, the court discusses common law ele-
ments of a master-servant relationship as necessary to establish application of work-
ers' compensation statutes. See Reasner, 387 A.2d at 681 (summarizing necessary
elements for master-servant relationship).
84. 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 22 (West 2005). The Pennsylvania Legislature
has defined employee as follows:
The term 'employe,' [sic] as used in this act is declared to be synony-
mous with servant, and includes -
All natural persons who perform services for another for a valuable
consideration, exclusive of persons whose employment is casual in char-
acter and not in the regular course of the business of the employer, and
exclusive of persons to whom articles or materials are given out to be
made up, cleaned, washed, altered, ornamented, finished or repaired, or
adapted for sale in the worker's own home, or on other premises, not
under the control or management of the employer .....
Id.
85. Id. § 51.
The employer shall be liable for the negligence of all employes [sic],
while acting within the scope of their employment, including engineers,
chauffeurs, miners, mine-foremen, fire-bosses, mine superintendents,
plumbers, officers of vessels, and all other employes [sic] licensed by the
Commonwealth or other governmental authority, if the employer be al-
lowed by law the right of free selection of such employes [sic] from the
class of persons thus licensed; and such employes [sic] shall be the agents
and representatives of their employers and their employers shall be re-
sponsible for the acts and neglects of such employes [sic], as in the case
of other agents and employes [sic] of their employers; and, notwithstand-
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athletes.86 PAWC, however, requires numerous after-tax reduc-
tions87 that significantly limit the professional athlete's ultimate
compensation. 88
ing the employment of such employes [sic], the property in and about
which they are employed, and the use and operation thereof, shall at all
times be under the supervision, management and control of their
employers.
Id.
86. For further discussion of Pennsylvania's inclusion of professional athletes
through statutory language and case law, see infra notes 89-116.
87. See 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 565 (West 2005) (limiting professional ath-
letes' compensation).
a) The eligibility of professional athletes for compensation under this act
shall be limited as provided in this section.
b) The term "professional athlete," as used in this section, shall mean a
natural person employed as a professional athlete by a franchise of the
National Football League, the National Basketball Association, the Na-
tional Hockey League, the National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs or the American League of Professional Baseball Clubs, under a
contract for hire or a collective bargaining agreement, whose wages as
defined in section 309 are more than eight times the Statewide average
weekly wage.
c) In the case of a professional athlete, any compensation payable under
this act with respect to partial disability shall be reduced by the after-tax
amount of any:
1) Wages payable by the employer during the period of disability
under a contract for hire or collective bargaining agreement.
2) Payments under a self-insurance, wage continuation, disability in-
surance or similar plan funded by the employer.
3) Injury protection or other injury benefits payable by the em-
ployer under a contract for hire or collective bargaining agreement.
d) No reduction shall be made pursuant to clause (c) against any com-
pensation payable under this act which becomes due and payable on a
date after the expiration or termination of the professional athlete's em-
ployment contract, except for any amounts paid by the employer pursu-
ant to the contract.
e) In the case of a professional athlete, the term "wages of the injured
employe [sic]" as used in section 306(b) for the purpose of computing
compensation for partial disability shall mean two times the Statewide av-
erage weekly wage.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
88. See Niles & West, supra note 82, at 11 (illustrating Section 565 and com-
menting on professional athlete's actual compensation). According to the
authors:
Workers' compensation benefits are limited for professional athletes:
Athletes whose careers end by injury can collect benefits up to $24,700
per year for ten years; The law covers all seven major league sports teams
in Pennsylvania; The law does not affect players earning less than eight
times the state's average weekly wage ($198,000); Minor League pro-
fessional athletes are not affected; Major leaguers making more than
$198,000 would have their workers' compensation benefits reduced, dol-
lar-for-dollar, by [w]ages paid during period of disability, [p]ayments
under self-insurance, wage continuation, disability insurance or similar
plan funded by the employer, [i]njury protection or other injury benefits
payable by the employer.
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ii. Case Law Solidifying Limited Compensation for Highly Paid
Professional Athletes
a. Bayless v. Philadelphia National League Club (Philadelphia Phillies)
In Bayless v. Philadelphia National League Club (Philadelphia Phil-
lies),89 Patrick B. Bayless sued the Philadelphia Phillies for "personal
injuries suffered while employed as a professional baseball pitcher
[for] the Phillies minor league farm system." 90 Initially, Bayless
sought compensation for his back injuries and mental illness.9 1 Af-
ter remand from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, Bayless only
pursued his mental illness complaint. 92 Bayless claimed while play-
ing for the Phillies minor league team, he took back medication
that led to his mental illness.93 Bayless wanted to sue the Phillies
for negligence.94 PAWC, in combination with motions for summary
judgment, became the Phillies' best weapon against Bayless. 95 The
district court decided PAWC applied to Bayless's suit.9 6 In attempt-
ing to avoid PAWC's reach, Bayless argued the Pennsylvania Legisla-
ture did not intend for PAWC to include "high priced athletes. '97
89. 472 F. Supp. 625 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
90. Id. at 627.
91. See id. (claiming Phillies had contractual duty to "provide him with good
sound medical care").
92. See id. ("As noted by the Court of Appeals, plaintiff has abandoned any
claims based on the physical injury to his back.").
93. See id. ("Plaintiff claims his mental illness was caused by the administration
of drugs following complaints of severe back pain. At the time the drugs were
administered, plaintiff was in defendant's employ and under the care of a team
trainer and physician supplied by defendant." (citation omitted)).
94. See Bayless, 472 F. Supp. at 627. "Defendant had.., a contractual duty to
plaintiff to provide him with good sound medical care in the event Plaintiff's skills
were being impaired by injury, illness or disease and Defendant failed to provide
such care." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting plaintiffs legal theory from plain-
tiff's complaint). Plaintiff also complained defendant failed to "provide proper
medical care in the administration of drugs," and failed to "obtain plaintiff's in-
formed consent to medical treatment." Id.
95. For further discussion of the district court's decision to apply PAWC re-
gardless of Bayless arguing PAWC lacked statutory intent to apply to highly paid
professional athletes, see infra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
96. See Bayless, 472 F. Supp. at 627-28 (describing PAWC's general purpose).
The Workmen's Compensation Act provides coverage for injuries
and death resulting from accidents occurring in the course of employ-
ment for all employees of employers who have agreed to accept the provi-
sions of the Act. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that there is a conclusive presumption that the parties to the employment
agreement have accepted the Act, absent either party's written notice of
rejection of its provisions.
Id.
97. Id. at 631 (citing plaintiffs brief).
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Relying on statutory language,9 8 the district court rejected Bayless's
argument.99 It concluded Bayless's only remedy was PAWC 0 0 be-
cause he suffered an injury within the course of his employment. ' 0'
b. Lyons v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Pittsburgh Steelers
Sports, Inc.)
Because Bayless struck out arguing PAWC intended to exclude
highly paid athletes, 10 2 the next challenger would have to find an-
other game plan.' 0 3 In Lyons v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board
(Pittsburgh Steelers),10 4 Plaintiff Mitchell W. Lyons dislocated his left
knee, "tear[ing] the posterior cruciate ligament, the anterior cruci-
ate ligament, medial collateral ligament and possible damage to the
meniscus with possible other damage to the interior."'1 5 As a re-
sult, he could no longer run, and therefore, could not "return to
his career as a professional football player." 10 6 He went before the
Workers' Compensation Appeal Board ("W.C.A.B.") who applied
98. For further discussion of PAWC's statutory language, see supra notes 83-87
and accompanying text.
99. See Bayless, 472 F. Supp. at 631 (reiterating district court's rationale against
Bayless's argument).
But the Act makes no such distinction. It applies to all employees regard-
less of their earnings. If professional athletes were excluded from cover-
age, then hundreds and possibly thousands of low as well as high priced
athletes on Major and Minor League Teams would be deprived of the
humanitarian benefits and protection the Act affords.
Id.
100. See id. at 628 (describing PAWC's general effect to employee's common
law rights and employment injuries).
By virtue of the Act, an employee's common law right to damages for
injuries suffered in the course of his employment as a result of his em-
ployer's negligence is completely surrendered in exchange for the exclu-
sive statutory right of the employee to compensation for all such injuries,
and the employer's liability as a tortfeasor is abrogated.
Id.
101. See id. (analyzing extensive application of PAWC and aftermath). "To
come within the purview of the Act, there must be both an accident in the course
of employment and an injury." Id. After examining Bayless's claim, the court de-
cided he was "within the ambit of the Workmen's Compensation Act as interpreted
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in that he avers 1) the defendant-employer's
assumption of a duty to provide proper medical care; 2) the failure to provide that
care; and 3) resultant harm." Id. at 630.
102. For a summary detailing Bayless's argument and district court's re-
sponse, see supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
103. For an examination of a recent case challenging PAWC, see infra notes
104-16 and accompanying text.
104. 803 A.2d 857 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002).
105. Id. at 858.
106. Id.
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PAWC's limitations.1 0 7 Lyons appealed the W.C.A.B.'s decision, ar-
guing PAWC violated the Equal Protection Clause.10 8
The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court examined the rele-
vant statutory language1 0 9 and conducted an equal protection anal-
ysis.l' 0 It decided professional athletes were "neither a suspect class
nor a sensitive classification, and [Section 565] implicates no funda-
mental or important right.""'1 Thus, under the rational basis test,
PAWC did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.'1 2 Further, the
significant difference between Lyons's pre-injury salary"1 3 and Ly-
ons's post-injury salary via PAWC's use of statewide weekly average
did not matter."l 4 Lyons further argued there was disparate treat-
ment among professional athletes." 5 Ultimately, the Pennsylvania
107. See id. For relevant statutory language, see supra notes 83-88.
108. See id. at 860 (summarizing plaintiff's legal argument before court).
109. For Section 565's exact statutory language, see supra note 87 and accom-
panying text.
110. See Lyons, 803 A.2d at 860 (outlining equal protection analysis).
The first step in an equal protection analysis is to determine which of
three types of scrutiny the reviewing court should apply to the challenged
classification: strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny or rational basis
scrutiny .....
The types of classification are: (1) classifications which implicate a
"suspect" class or a fundamental right; (2) classifications implicating an
"important" though not fundamental right or a "sensitive" classification;
and (3) classifications which involve none of these. Should the statutory
classification in question fall into the first category, the statute is strictly
construed in light of a "compelling" governmental purpose; if the classifi-
cation falls into the second category, a heightened standard of scrutiny is
applied to an "important" governmental purpose; and if the statutory
scheme falls into the third category, the statute is upheld if there is any
rational basis for the classification.
Id. (quoting Smith v. City of Phila., 516 A.2d 306, 311 (Pa. 1986)).
111. Id.
112. See id. at 860-61 (explaining rational basis test and defining what satisfies
rational basis test).
A classification satisfies rational basis scrutiny so long as the legisla-
tive distinction has some rational ground that relates to a legitimate state
purpose. In conducting its analysis, "the reviewing court is free to hy-
pothesize reasons that the legislature might have had for the classifica-
tion;" the reviewing court cannot question the soundness or wisdom of
the legislative distinction if "any state of facts reasonably can be conceived
to sustain that classification." A law will not be found to violate equal
protection under rational basis scrutiny simply because the classifications
drawn by the legislature are imperfect or result in some inequality.
Id. at 861 (citations omitted).
113. See id. at 859 (informing readers Lyons's actual weekly wage was
$8,075.90).
114. See id. (declaring Lyons's compensation as $1,176, "two times the State-
wide average weekly wage of $588").
115. See Lyons, 803 A.2d at 861 (summarizing Lyons's argument).
Lyons further contends that there is no logical reason to distinguish be-
tween professional athletes who receive eight times the Statewide average
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Commonwealth Court still rejected Lyons's arguments under a ra-
tional basis analysis.116
C. Contract Negotiation: Abilities of Unions and Individuals to
Negotiate for Future Contracts
The previous sections summarized what remedies the injured
professional athlete can expect under common tort law' 17 and stat-
utory provisions.'1 8 This section discusses options athletes pursue
collectively via Collective Bargaining Agreements. 119 This section
also discusses avenues athletes pursue individually in order to pre-
pare for potential future injuries. 20
i. Collective Bargaining Agreements: Their Protection and Limitations
Unions represent professional athletes in the four major pro-
fessional sports: Major League Baseball ("MLB"), National Basket-
weekly wage and those who receive less than that amount, and he sug-
gests that the only purpose served by [Section 565] is to confer an eco-
nomic benefit upon the owners of the athletic organizations that the law
targets.
Id.
116. See id. at 862 (rationalizing why distinction among professional athletes
still passes rational basis scrutiny). "Although these characteristics may apply
equally to some other occupations, the fact that a classification is imperfect does
not render it arbitrary. ... The cut-off chosen by the legislature need not be math-
ematically perfect in order to withstand rational basis scrutiny." Id. Although
PAWC does include professional athletes, the Lyons court discussed the Florida
District Court of Appeals rationale in Rudolph v. Miami Dolphins, Ltd., 447 So. 2d
284 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), when analyzing the Florida Legislature's decision to
exclude professional athletes from its WCS. See id. at 861-62 (declaring Florida
Legislature's decision focused on profession's risk and compensation). The Flor-
ida District Court of Appeals in Rudolph analyzed the Florida Legislature's decision
to exclude professional athletes from its Workers' Compensation statute as follows:
The professional athlete exclusion is not a wholly arbitrary one. Profes-
sional football players incur serious injuries on a regular, frequent, and
repetitive basis. They are generally well paid, and as the NFL contracts in
these cases exemplify, they willfully hold themselves out as well-skilled in
the sport of their choice. They make a conscious decision to use their
skills in an occupation involving a high risk of frequent, repetitive, and
serious injury.
Rudolph, 447 So. 2d at 291.
117. For an examination of tort law doctrines applied to sports injuries cases,
see supra notes 31-63 and accompanying text.
118. For a discussion and comparison of WCS, see supra notes 64-79 and ac-
companying text.
119. For a discussion of professional sports' unions and their attempts to best
protect professional athletes through collective bargaining terms and conditions,
see infra notes 12242 and accompanying text.
120. For an examination of individual contract negotiation with teams and
private insurance companies, see infra notes 145-53, 190-201, and accompanying
text.
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ball Association ("NBA"), National Football League ("NFL"), and
National Hockey League ("NHL"). 12 1 The Union officials negoti-
ate with team owners and managers over the collective bargaining
agreement ("CBA"), which governs all the union's members. 12 2
The CBA's terms and conditions address compensation, benefits,
and regulations relating to that particular sport. 123 The following
discussion focuses on the typical provisions covered in CBAs. 124
Generally, CBAs provide athletes with some type of remedy
when injured.125 The extent of that protection, however, depends
on: 1) the franchise sport, 12 6 2) "whether the player is a party to a
standard or guaranteed contract,"127 3) the club's disability pension
plans,1 28 and 4) the arbitration provisions interpreting these disabil-
ity provisions. 129 Under a standard, non-guaranteed player con-
tract, the team gives an injured player one year's salary, but a team
can also terminate the player's contract if the player cannot "ex-
hibit sufficient skill or competitive ability to qualify or continue as a
member of the Club's team." 30 Unlike a standard contract, a guar-
121. For a description of unions' representation of professional athletes, see
infra notes 122-32 and accompanying text.
122. See Herbert, supra note 16, at 246 (describing players' unions involve-
ment in negotiating players' possible benefits in players' contracts with their
teams).
123. See id. (defining CBA and its general purpose for professional athletes).
The CBA dictates the terms and conditions of the players' contracts with
their teams, the rules and regulations of the sport, and any benefits the
players are entitled to receive. The CBA is enforceable by and against all
players and owners within the sport, regardless of whether or not an indi-
vidual player agrees with the terms of the CBA.
Id.
124. See id. ("The CBA provides an injured player with possible benefits under
his contract, as well as possible benefits under his pension plan if the player has
suffered a total and permanent disability.").
125. For an analysis of CBA disability provisions for injured athletes, see infra
notes 179-86.
126. See Redlingshafer, supra note 15, at 106-15 (discussing disability and med-
ical benefits in CBAs of NBA, MLB, NHL, and NFL with emphasis on NFL).
127. Herbert, supra note 16, at 247.
128. For a summary of disability provisions, see infra notes 130-32 and accom-
panying text.
129. For a discussion of arbitration provisions' role in interpreting profes-
sional athletes' disability pension plans, see infra notes 133-37 and accompanying
text.
130. Herbert, supra note 16, at 247 (quoting Player's Contract, The Nat'l League
of Professional Clubs, at para. 7(b) (2)). "However, if the player is unable to compete
because he has been injured in the course and scope of his employment, he will
receive his 'full salary for the period of disability not to exceed the remainder of
the season."' Id. (quoting Player's Contract, The Nat' League of Professional Clubs, at
Regulations, para. (2)). The NBA, NFL, and NHL have very similar, if not identi-
cal, provisions in their CBAs. See Redlingshafer, supra note 15, at 106-15 (discuss-
ing CBA disability provisions of all four sports franchises).
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anteed contract usually rns for two to five years and awards com-
pensation even if the player cannot demonstrate enough "skill or
competitive ability to qualify or continue as a member of the
[Club's] team."'13 A guaranteed contract offers more protection,
but still does not provide the ultimate security injured athletes seek
for themselves and their families. 132
Grievance procedures within the CBA also implicitly affect the
injured athlete's recovery.1 33 Typically, CBAs require arbitrators to
resolve disputes based on contract interpretation.' 34 If an athlete
wants to challenge salary, medical benefits, salary received when in-
jured, or any other CBA provision, the athlete must go through ar-
bitration. 13 5  Although arbitration is limited in its remedial
power,136 courts have deferred many disputes between professional
athletes and their teams to arbitration, claiming the disputes re-
quire contract interpretation. 137
The CBA also protects athletes through disability benefits and
pension plan options.13 8 Devastating and career-ending injuries
131. Herbert, supra note 16, at 247 (quoting Player's Contract, The Natl League
of Professional Clubs, at para. 7(b)(2)).
132. See id. at 248 ("Neither the standard nor the guaranteed player's contract
provides compensation based on whether the player was negligently or intention-
ally injured by his employing team, trainer or physician."). For further discussion
on disability, pension plan provisions, and arbitration provisions, see infra notes
138-42 and accompanying text.
133. See Herbert, supra note 16, at 248 (restating United States Supreme Court
holding on applicable labor relations law). "The Supreme Court has held that
§ 301 of LMRA (Labor Management Relations Act) preempts state-law claims that
are 'substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made
between the parties in a labor contract."' Id. (quoting Allis-Chambers Corp. v.
Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985)).
134. See id. at 249 ("If a player has a claim against the team that requires
interpretation of his contract, the CBA stipulates that the player's sole remedy is
arbitration.").
135. See id. (voicing arbitration's significance in professional sports' CBAs).
136. See id. (explaining briefly arbitration's significant limitations).
The primary purpose of arbitration is to ensure uniform interpreta-
tion of the CBA. Since claims that are subject to mandatory arbitration
are based on a breach of contract theory, such claims will only provide an
injured player with contract damages. Arbitration will not compensate
the negligently or intentionally injured athlete for damages that usually
accompany a tort injury, such as: loss of earning capacity, disfigurement,
physical impairment, medical care or physical pain and mental suffering.
Id. (footnote omitted).
137. See id. at 250-51 (summarizing relevant case law demonstrating uncer-
tainty regarding athletes' ability to sue for physical battery).
138. For a discussion detailing different provisions regarding disability and
pension, see infra notes 139-42.
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trigger these benefits, 39 and subsequently, a pension committee
"determines, under a clear and convincing evidence standard, if a
player qualifies for disability benefits under the Plan."1 40 Typically,
the disability provisions in pension plans provide some compensa-
tion for athletes' injuries. 141 Because both the pension plan and
disability provisions are part of the team's agreement with the
union and all its members, all injured players receive the same com-
pensation whether the injury resulted from their team or another
athlete's negligence. 142
ii. Privatized Insurance Option: Status and Power Needed to Protect
Yourself
In addition to the respective CBAs' standard insurance op-
tions, 14 3 a professional athlete might still desire further protection
139. See Herbert, supra note 16, at 259 (articulating triggering instances for
disability and pension plan benefits in MLB).
The disability benefits offered under the Pension Plan provide financial
protection to all players who suffer a "total and permanent" disability that
prevents them from performing any type of work for wage or profit. A
total and permanent disability is one where it is "not likely that the player
in question is likely to recover from his total disability."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
140. Id. If athletes want to appeal the pension committee's decision, they can
sue "pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), but only
after the player has exhausted any administrative appeal available under his Pen-
sion Plan." Id.; see Sweeney v. Bert Bell NFL Ret. Plan, 961 F. Supp. 1381, 1390
(S.D. Cal. 1997) (outlining conclusions of law and demonstrating athlete's diffi-
culty to successfully appeal pension committee's decision not to award pension).
141. See Herbert, supra note 16, at 246, 259 (reporting MLB CBA approach is
similar to other professional sports leagues); National Football League Player's As-
sociation: Medical Insurance, http://www.nflpa.org/Members/main.asp?sub-
Page=player+Benefits (last visited Oct. 19, 2005) ("[E]ntire cost of all medical
benefits for players and their families is paid."); Lewis, supra note 32, at 266-67
(commenting on NFL's approach to player injury).
A NFL team is not required to expend continued medical care and treat-
ment to an injured player beyond the duration of the injured player's
contract. A player's contract is not renewed if he cannot pass the physical
examination for the ensuing year(s). Of course, a player suffering a
debilitating injury cannot successfully pass the team physical, and his sal-
ary expectations will be terminated along with the contract.
Lewis, supra note 32, at 266-67 (footnotes omitted).
142. See Herbert, supra note 16, at 259 (exploring athletes' equal treatment
through these provisions). Compensation is "not provided to an injured player
based on whether the injury received was negligently or intentionally inflicted.
Therefore, the Pension Plan does not compensate an injured player for the tor-
tious conduct that resulted in his injury. All player injuries are equally compen-
sated." Id. (footnote omitted).
143. For overall information on the disability insurance options sports unions
generally negotiate and receive, see supra notes 121-42 and accompanying text.
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and can ultimately rely upon additional insurance. 144 Professional
athletes and entertainers can take matters into their own hands by
purchasing disability or life insurance. 145 For peace of mind, and
potential increased marketability,1 46 some athletes and celebrities
should consider spending additional money on insurance to ensure
financial stability if injured.147 Similar to non-celebrity injured indi-
viduals searching for disability insurance, professional athletes and
celebrities who desire additional coverage have to shop around for
a willing insurance carrier. 148 Unfortunately for some professional
entertainers and professional non-elite athletes, the price of the ad-
ditional insurance exceeds what they want to spend.1 49
144. See infra notes 145-53 and accompanying text (explaining insurance op-
tions available to professional athletes that can either be executed individually or
through respective teams).
145. See Hynes, supra note 25, at 332 (discussing insurance policies entertain-
ers and celebrities obtain to protect themselves in anticipation of injuries).
Casual perusal of the newspapers reveals stories of highly compen-
sated athletes or entertainers who purchase disability or life insurance
policies worth millions of dollars. For example, before the championship
game in college football in January of 2003, the star running back for the
University of Miami purchased a two and a half million dollar policy to
protect himself against a career ending injury.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
146. See id. (citing Ken Rosenthal, Insurance Should Help Gonzalez Land Long-
Term Deal, SPORTING NEWS, Nov. 26, 2001). Hynes explains the use of additional
insurance to obtain increased marketability as follows:
The most lucrative policies often name the employers of these celebrities
as the beneficiaries. This is partly because these celebrities often have
contracts that guarantee payment in the event of injury; these celebrities
are already insured against these risks. But, of course, the insurance pro-
vided by the guarantee comes at a price; the celebrity would have been
able to negotiate a higher salary if she did not receive the guarantee.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
147. See id. (mentioning how celebrities are purchasing disability and life in-
surance policies for protection).
148. See, e.g., eGlobalHealth Insurers Agency, LLC, http://www.eglobal
health.com/disability-insurance.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2005) (listing disability
insurance for professional athletes and celebrities as part of its services); Interna-
tional Risk Management (IRM), http://www.internationalriskmanagement.com
(last visited Oct. 18, 2005) (promoting itself as high limit provider of professional
athlete insurance); Group Health Plans of La, http://www.grouphealthplans.com/
petersen.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2005) (offering disability insurance options to
both celebrities and professional athletes).
149. See Redlingshafer, supra note 15, at 124 (avoiding discussion of purchas-
ing disability insurance because "receiving coverage of this insurance is not neces-
sarily the norm in mainstream athletics and notably for lower-paid, little
experienced athletes, especially since many of these policies are extremely
expensive").
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Professional athletes with highly lucrative contracts usually do
not have to seek an additional insurance carrier. 50 If the profes-
sional athlete receives such a contract, the contract is probably
guaranteed and the team would be responsible for the remainder
of the contract. 151 Because of this responsibility, teams often insure
guaranteed contracts.1 52 In this situation, the team would purchase
an insurance policy on the athlete's contract, and upon a career-
ending injury, the policy would pay out the rest of the contract. 153
III. ANALYSIS
A TALE OF Two JAYSONS:
ANALYZING JAYSON WILLIAMS'S INJURY AS ELITE V. NON-ELITE
& INEXPERIENCED NBA PLAYER
The following analysis examines the potential recovery for Jay-
son Williams, an elite NBA player, versus a hypothetical Jayson Wil-
liams, a non-elite NBA player with one year experience in the
NBA. 154 The analysis compares both elite and non-elite Jayson Wil-
liams under the different legal, 155 statutory,1 5 6 and contractual 57
settings.
150. For an explanation of why players signing high-paying guaranteed con-
tracts do not have to self-insure their contracts, see infra notes 151, 190-201, and
accompanying text.
151. For an explanation of guaranteed contracts, see supra notes 130-32 and
accompanying text.
152. See Rovell, supra note 7, 5 ("NBA teams insure large, guaranteed player
contracts in order to protect themselves against injury."); see also NCAA, Cata-
strophic Injury Insurance Program (2003-04), 2, http://www.ncaa.org/insurance/
catpolicyO3-04.pdf (last visited July 10, 2005) (listing NCAA insurance benefits as:
medical, dental, rehabilitation, custodial care expense, total and partial disability,
adjustment expense, special expense, ancillary illness or injury, college education,
vocational rehabilitation, assimilation, and death benefits).
153. See, e.g., Rovell, supra note 7, 4-5 (recountingJayson Williams's insur-
ance policy with NewJersey Nets and how Nets cashed in on policy when Williams
broke his right leg and "ruptured his knee").
154. In the remainder of the analysis, elite Jayson Williams will refer to the
actual Jayson Williams, while non-elite Jayson Williams will refer to the "hypotheti-
cal"Jayson Williams. Additionally, the fact pattern of elite Jayson Williams's injury
will also apply to non-elite Jayson Williams.
155. For background information on tort law in sports injury cases, see supra
notes 37-63 and accompanying text.
156. For information on WCS and its distinct application to professional ath-
letes, see supra notes 64-79 and accompanying text.
157. For background information regarding disability provisions on collective
bargaining agreements between professional athletes and management, see supra
notes 121-42 and accompanying text.
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A. Negligence Claims
Although suing is always an option in the United States, it is an
unlikely game-winning strategy for the professional athlete in a
semi-contact sport such as basketball.158 Under Hackbart's reckless-
ness standard, 59 elite and non-elite Williams would both have a dif-
ficult time winning unless they could prove Stephon Marbury's
collision was intentional.1 60 Even if elite and non-elite Williams
could prove Marbury's intent to collide with him and cause injury,
to sue the Nets, both Williams need to prove the Net coaches and/
or policy prompted Marbury to hurt fellow teammate Williams. 161
Knight's assumption of risk doctrine1 62 also seems futile under Wil-
liams's fact pattern. Under this doctrine, both elite and non-elite
Williams would have to prove the collision with Marbury was reck-
less and not part of professional basketball's assumed risk. 163 Al-
158. For a discussion of societal views on participation of sports and how
sports participants should handle injuries, see supra notes 34-63 and accompanying
text. For an examination of courts' reluctance to interfere with professional sports
injuries, see infra notes 158-65.
159. For more details and background information on the recklessness stan-
dard established in Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir.
1979), see supra notes 37-52 and accompanying text.
160. Compare supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text (inferring collision be-
tween Williams and Marbury was accidental and occurred during regulation of
game), with Richardson, supra note 20, at 140-41 (emphasizing Clark's hit against
Hackbart occurred after play ended and arose out of Clark's then frustration).
161. See Lauren Krohn, Cause of Action Against Employer to Recover Under Doctrine
of Respondeat Superior for Intentional Torts Committed by Employee, in 17 CAUSES OF AC-
TION 647, 647-48 (Oct. 2004) (listing prima facie case for intentional torts commit-
ted by employee under respondeat superior).
PRIMA FACIE CASE
A prima facie case in a respondeat superior action to recover from the
employer for the intentional tort of an employee requires proof:
1. of the underlying tort committed by the employee;
2. that the tortfeasor was a bona fide employee of the defendant; and
3. that the tortfeasor was acting within the "scope of employment" when
the tort was committed; or
4. that the tortfeasor was acting within the "scope of apparent authority";
or
5. that the employer authorized or ratified the tortious conduct
Id. (internal references omitted).
162. For a discussion of assumption of the risk doctrine, see supra notes 53-59
and accompanying text.
163. See Rosenthal, supra note 14, at 2650-51 (clarifying liability standard es-
tablished by Knight Court).
[A] participant in an active sport breaches a legal duty of care to other
participants - i.e., engages in conduct that properly may subject him or
her to financial liability - only if the participant intentionally injures an-
other player or engages in conduct that is so reckless as to be totally outside the
range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport.
Id. at 2651 (emphasis added) (quoting Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 711 (Cal.
1992)). Even under assumption of the risk doctrine, the injured professional ath-
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though some courts are hearing more sports injury cases, the policy
considerations164 would not apply to professional athletes. 65 Addi-
tionally, the societal notion of keeping judiciary courts out of bas-
ketball courts and other sporting arenas may further prevent
injured professional athletes from successfully recovering in negli-
gence suits. 166
B. Workers' Compensation Statutes
Although New Jersey Workers' Compensation Statutes 67
would apply to both Jayson Williams, it is interesting to analyze the
potential compensation under Pennsylvania's Workers' Compensa-
tion Statute ("PAWC"). PAWC specifically includes professional
lete would have to prove Marbury's collision was both intentional, and "totally
outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport." Id. Because the
collision occurred on the basketball court, while both players were running and
playing the game, it seems unlikely, this could be considered outside the range of
ordinary activity involved in basketball. For details on Williams's collision and con-
sequences, see supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
164. See Rosenthal, supra note 14, at 2659-60 (listing policy considerations as:
economic consequences, participant's purpose in playing sport, participant's expe-
rience level and age, role models' impact on younger players, and "importance of
maintaining competition").
165. See id. at 2660 (asserting that some commentators emphasize economic
considerations as significant in deciding which. standard applies in sports injury
cases).
Professional athletes generally are able to bear the cost of injuries
that result from sports participation because they receive salaries - often
very substantial salaries - for their participation. Professionals may also
continue to be paid even if their injury is career-ending. Furthermore,
professional athletes likely have insurance coverage and teams often em-
ploy their own physician to provide medical care to the athletes ...
[P]rofessional athletes often have unions and agents to bargain with
leagues or governing bodies on their behalf, giving them leverage to ob-
tain greater benefits, salaries, or on-field protections.
Id. at 2663-64 (footnotes omitted).
166. See Richardson, supra note 20, at 139 (alluding to courts and players'
discouragement of judicial courts' involvement in sports injuries cases). "They
view rule reform and improved control of the game by officials as violence control
mechanisms superior to the increased involvement of legal tribunals: 'Better a
man with a whistle regulating the game than a man with a wig.'" Id. at 138; see also
Lura Hess, Note, Sports and the Assumption of Risk Doctrine in New York, 76 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 457, 475 (2002) (reporting increase in sports injury cases due to amateur
sports arena). "In recent years courts around the country have been presented
with a great number of sporting injury lawsuits between participants, but outside
the professional sports context." Hess, supra, at 458 n.7 (quoting Stephen D.
Sugarman, The Monsanto Lecture: Assumption of Risk, 31 VAL. U. L. REv. 833, 876
(1997)).
167. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-36 (West 2005) (defining employer and em-
ployee and avoiding specific mention or exclusion of professional athletes from
definition).
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athletes, 168 and recent case law is available.1 69 Section 565 of PAWC
establishes specific disability pay-outs for all professional athletes.1
7 0
Specifically, Williams and any other Pennsylvania professional ath-
lete would start with a disability benefit of $1,176 per week.1 71
From this $1,176, the CBA disability insurance provisions172 would
be deducted along with any other self-insurance or employer insur-
ance. 173 So in the case of Jayson Williams, his $1,176 would be de-
ducted significantly due to both the CBA and employer insurance
on his contract. 174 According to the Lyons court, it is insignificant
how much an injured athlete made prior to injury relative to the
PAWC pay-out.' 75 Thus, whether elite Williams would receive any
workers' compensation is questionable because of the many
deductions.' 76
Non-elite and inexperienced Williams would probably receive
some compensation from PAWC. 177 Non-elite Williams does obtain
a greater workers' compensation pay-out, but this amount is still
168. For a discussion of the statute's inclusion of professional athletes, see
supra notes 82-86.
169. For an analysis of the Lyons case and a professional athlete's equal pro-
tection challenge against Section 565, see supra notes 104-16 and accompanying
text.
170. See 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 565 (West 2005) (setting initial disability
pay-out for professional athletes at two times statewide weekly average).
171. See id. § 565(e) (proclaiming disability pay-out prior to deductions as two
times statewide weekly average); id. § 601 (paralleling current payment installment
with pre-injury payment installment); Lyons v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd. (Pitts-
burgh Steelers Sports, Inc.), 803 A.2d 857, 859 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002) (declaring
statewide average weekly wage as $588).
172. For a discussion of CBA provisions to Jayson Williams's situation as elite
and non-elite professional athlete, see infra notes 179-86 and accompanying text.
173. See 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 565(c) (West 2005) (outlining deductions
made before professional athlete receives payment).
174. For a discussion of the CBA provisions applied to Williams, see infra
notes 179-86 and accompanying text. For details about New Jersey Nets's insur-
ance on Jayson Williams's contract, see supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
175. See Lyons, 803 A.2d at 862 (rationalizing legislature's decision to draft
statute in manner that effectively prevents professional athletes from earning what
they did pre-injury).
176. See 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 565(c) (West 2005) (requiring deduction
of wages paid by employer and payments from self, disability, and employer
funded insurance). If the Nets insured Williams's entire six-year $86 million con-
tract, the insurance company would pay an estimated weekly amount of $275,641
which exceeds $1,176. Thus, Williams would not receive any compensation PAWC.
177. See Exhibit C: Minimum Annual Salary Scale, supra note 18 (establishing
non-elite player with one year in NBA earned $350,000 in 1999). Such a player
would most likely not have insurance so the self-insurance deduction would not
apply. 'See 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 565 (c) (requiring deduction of self-insurance
from workers' compensation). The individual NBA disability CBA provision would
probably not completely offset the $1,176 so a non-elite Williams would actually
receive workers' compensation. See Article IV: Benefits, at 34, http://www.nbpa.
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significantly less than his pre-injury salary. 17 8 Thus, even though he
is receiving more workers' compensation, non-elite Williams would
have to rely on other methods to attain financial security in the
event of a career-ending injury.179
C. Contractual Applications
i. CBA Implications
The NBA's CBA establishes players' contract regulations that
teams must follow. 1 80 Elite and non-elite players' contracts have the
same basic coverage regarding disability provisions.18' Although
the CBA establishes basic minimums, the team and the player indi-
vidually negotiate the contract's specific terms. '8 2 Additionally, the
com/downloads.CBA.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2005) (listing benefits provisions
guaranteed by CBA to NBA players).
178. See Exhibit C: Minimum Annual Salary Scale, supra note 18 (listing$350,000 as minimum salary for professional basketball player with one year of
service in NBA during 1998-99 season). For non-elite Williams, the career ending
injury decreases income significantly from $350,000 to $61,152 [$1,176 multiplied
by 52 weeks], pre-statutory deductions.
179. For an examination of CBA provisions and self-insurance and employer
insurance options for injured professional athletes, see infra notes 180-200 and
accompanying text. See Niles & West, supra note 82, at 30 (commenting that exclu-
sion of professional athletes from workers' compensation statutes will probably
draw minimal sympathy). "In the end, as long as professional athletes continue to
earn astronomical wages, the public will be hesitant to hear their cries of unfair
treatment." Id. at 30.
180. See Redlingshafer, supra note 15, at 106 (informing readers on different
provisions in NBA's CBA regarding disability, life, medical, and dental insurance).
181. See Article IV: Benefits, supra note 177, at 34 (narrating benefits provi-
sions guaranteed by CBA to NBA players).
Except as set forth below, effective with the date of this Agreement,
and continuing for the duration thereof, the NBA shall provide the fol-
lowing benefits to NBA players and, in the case of Section (a) below, for-
mer NBA players: (a) (1) Subject to the provisions of Section (a) (3)
below, League-wide pension benefits in accordance with the terms of the
National Basketball Association Players' Pension Plan, as restated effec-
tive February 2, 1996, as amended by the First and Second Amendments
thereto (the "Plan"). In accordance with the collective bargaining agree-
ment made as of September 18, 1995, the Plan has been amended so that
the "Normal Retirement Pension" payable to a player under the Plan is
the maximum monthly amount permitted by the applicable benefit limi-
tations under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the
"Code") to be paid to the player at his "Normal Retirement Date" under
the Plan (the "Maximum Monthly Benefit").
(c) Disability insurance benefits, as set forth in the Standard Security Life
Insurance Co. of New York, Policy No. SSL524-16343.
Id.
182. See, e.g., Exhibit A: National Basketball Association Uniform Player Con-
tract, at A-i, http://www.nbpa.com/downloads.CBA.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2005)
Vol. 1 : p. 133
28
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol13/iss1/4
SAME INJURY; DIFFERENT COVERAGE
application of these disability benefits and provisions differ between
the elite and non-elite player. 18 3 The guarantee of disability insur-
ance is not the same amount for elite and non-elite Williams.1 8 4 It
is also possible the contracted disability insurance would not pro-
vide enough for the non-elite, inexperienced player. 185 Further,
when appealing or challenging the amount of disability or pension
provided, all professional athletes, elite and non-elite, must go
through the CBA grievance procedure that ultimately ends with ar-
bitration, not trial. 8 6 So if either elite or non-elite Williams wanted
to challenge the disability insurance or pension, an arbitrator
would ultimately hear and decide the case. 187
(showing standard uniform player contract language but leaving blank areas re-
garding salary, benefits, pension, and termination for negotiation between individ-
ual athlete and team).
183. For a discussion contrasting disability guarantee of player with lucrative
contracts against less elite players, see infra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
184. Compare Puma, supra note 3, 12 (deducing elite Williams's annual sal-
ary as $14.3 million ($86 million/6 years)), with Exhibit C: Minimum Annual Sal-
ary Scale, supra note 18 (implying non-elite Williams, as NBA player with one-year
service in NBA, would earn $350,000 for 1998-99 season). Disability insurance
would be worth more to the non-elite Williams than the elite Williams.
185. See, e.g., Redlingshafer, supra note 15, at 102-05 (recounting story of Greg
Lotysz, 6'6", 310-lb offensive tackle, who seriously injured his knee during second
day of team practice with New York Jets and could not qualify for disability provi-
sions in NFL CBA).
186. See, e.g., Article XXXI Grievance and Arbitration Procedure, § l(a), at
213, http://www.nbpa.com/downloads.CBA.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2005) (out-
lining grievance procedure that governs NBA teams and players). NBA Grievance
and Arbitration Procedure as follows:
(a) Any dispute (such dispute hereinafter being referred to as a
"Grievance") involving the interpretation or application of, or compli-
ance with, the provisions of this Agreement or the provisions of a Player
Contract (except as provided in paragraph 9 of a Uniform Player Con-
tract), including a dispute concerning the validity of a Player Contract,
shall be resolved exclusively by the Grievance Arbitrator in accordance
with the procedures set forth in this Article; provided, however, that dis-
putes arising under Articles VII, VIII, X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, XVI,
XXXVII, XXXIX, and XL shall (except as otherwise specifically provided
by Article VII, Section 3(d) (5) above) be determined by the System Arbi-
trator provided for in Article XXXII.
Id. For further discussion on the court's approach to arbitration being the final
word on interpreting collective bargaining agreement, see supra notes 133-37 and
accompanying text.
187. For a discussion of arbitration and its finality regarding CBA provisions,
specifically disability and pension payment, see supra note 186 and accompanying
text.
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ii. Privatized Insurance Application
In comparison to all the other protective options available to
professional athletes when injured, 188 privatized insurance 189 is ar-
guably the best option because it seems the most certain. Although
all professional athletes face similar risks of injuries, 190 the availabil-
ity of this extra insurance is not similar.191 An athlete's bargaining
power, propensity to injury, marketability, value to the team, and
whether the contract is guaranteed or standard all help team own-
ers decide whether to purchase insurance for the player's
contract.
19 2
Fortunately for elite Jayson Williams, the ball tipped in his
favor when the New Jersey Nets insured his six-year, $86 million
contract. 93 Williams signed the contract after selection to the 1998
All-Star Game and amidst elevation to a hometown favorite. 194 The
following year, he used his rising status to sign a lucrative and guar-
anteed contract. 195 Because the New Jersey Nets were aware of his
188. For a summary of legal, statutory, and contractual remedies for elite and
non-elite injured professional athletes, see supra notes 158-87 and accompanying
text.
189. In this sentence and in the section's title, the term "privatized insurance"
means both self-insurance bought by the player and insurance on the player's con-
tract paid by the employer. In the rest of the analysis, the two are distinguished.
For an analysis of privatized insurance options for professional athletes, see infra
notes 190-201.
190. See, e.g., Richardson, supra note 20, at 134 (reporting 2002 statistics of
sporting injuries according to each sport).
Basketball was played by over 36 million people in 2002; 2,783,000 partici-
pants were injured (7.6%). Soccer was played by 17,641,000 players in
2002, 1,063,000 of whom were injured (9.3%). 602,000 of the 10,402,000
people who played baseball in 2002 were injured (5.8%). The injury rate
was highest in the two contact sports where violent collisions are an inher-
ent part of the game: 15.9% of ice hockey players (415,000 of the
2,612,000 participants in 2002) and 18.8% of football players (1,083,000
of the 5,783,000 who played in 2002) were injured.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
191. For an examination of the economic and bargaining disparity between
elite and non-elite professional athlete, see infra notes 192-200 and accompanying
text.
192. For a discussion of the New Jersey Nets' consideration of these factors
when purchasing insurance policy for Williams's contract, see infra notes 194-200
and accompanying text.
193. See Rovell, supra note 7, 4-5 (explaining advantage toJayson Williams
when New Jersey Nets purchased insurance policy).
194. See generally On the Court, supra note 4 (follow "1998-99" hyperlink)
(providing timeline of Williams's troubles on and off court).
195. See Rovell, supra note 7, 4 (reporting year and amount of Williams's
contract as six years, $86-million dollars).
[Vol. 13: p. 133
30
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol13/iss1/4
SAME INJURY; DIFFERENT COVERAGE
propensity for injury, 196 they gave him the elite contract and pur-
chased the insurance policy to protect themselves. 197
A non-elite and inexperienced Williams would lack the neces-
sary bargaining power to protect himself in a similar manner.198
Theoretically, a non-elite Williams could still insure himself,' 99 but
with his minimum salary, it seems to be an unrealistic option.200 It
is likely that if a non-elite and inexperienced Williams suffered the
same ruptured knee, his dreams of playing professionally and en-
joying financial security would also have ruptured.20 1
IV. IMPACT
Jayson Williams's comeback attempt could deter both private
insurance carriers and teams from insuring guaranteed con-
tracts.20 2 Nonetheless, the use of privatized insurance worked well
196. See On the Court, supra note 4 (follow "1998-99" hyperlink) (recounting
Williams's constant battles with injuries which began in college and continued
through his professional career).
197. See Rovell, supra note 7, 1 5 ("NBA teams insure large, guaranteed player
contracts in order to protect themselves against injury.").
198. See Redlingshafer, supra note 15, at 100-01 (commenting how inexperi-
enced athletes do not receive astronomical wages nor sufficient protection if in-
jured, but society still believes they receive both). Redlingshafer discusses the
actual perception and reality of all injured professional athletes; the reality is that
non-elite professional athletes do not have the bargaining power to obtain an in-
sured contract and must rely on changes to the current system.
Many [commentators] will immediately chime in that these persons are
overpaid crybabies who are more than able to take care of any medical
costs they endure due to injury. Even though it is tough to deny that this
is the case for many athletes, a vast number of others made or make sala-
ries at a rate more commensurate with ordinary citizens. These athletes
still don a uniform in the hopes of becoming a superstar, but may now
face the reality their dreams are cut short due to a debilitating injury....
The current system to obtain recourse is by no means uniform or fair
to all who wish to reap its benefits. A change to the current system needs
to be instituted immediately, making financial support available for those
athletes that do not and will never receive an exorbitant salary - those
who may have only gone to a few practices, and never played a game -
but nonetheless were injured and cast aside by respective teams.
Id.
199. For a listing of insurance companies that will insure professional ath-
letes, see supra note 148.
200. See Redlingshafer, supra note 15, at 124 (rationalizing elimination of self-
insurance discussion from article by noting such insurance policies' extreme price
and many athletes' inability to pay for them).
201. See, e.g., id. at 102-05 (discussing story of Greg Lotysz whose dreams of
playing professional sports were cut short when he suffered injury during second
day of practice of his second season with New York Jets).
202. See Rovell, supra note 7, 6 (speculating insurance companies would go
after New Jersey Nets because Williams now desires comeback to professional
basketball).
20061
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for him.20 3 Williams benefited via the privatized insurance because
of his status and individual negotiating.20 4 Considering not every
professional athlete has such bargaining power, some changes
could protect athletes who work just as hard but do not receive the
spotlight or the guaranteed contracts. 20 5 The inexperienced and
non-elite professional athletes would be the target groups for pro-
posed changes to the current legal, statutory, or contractual
schemes. 20 6 Unlike their elite colleagues with lucrative and guaran-
teed contracts, these inexperienced and non-elite athletes are inad-
equately supported financially upon severe injury.20 7 Currently,
amidst the legal, statutory, and contractual limitations, self-insur-
ance or employer's insurance on the contract would be the savior at
"If I'm the Nets, I'm thinking, 'Whoa, now that we're done paying
him, he has his skills back?"' said Jim Padilla, an independent sports in-
surance broker. "And if I'm the insurance company that paid the Nets so
that they could payJayson, I'm thinking that the money was paid to the
Nets believing that his injury was career-ending, so they're going to want
to recoup some of that."
Id.
203. See id. 6-15 (summarizing Williams's injury and continued income
thereafter).
204. For a discussion scrutinizing Williams's individual bargaining power and
external factors which prompted team's insuring of contract, see supra notes 193-
200 and accompanying text.
205. See Redlingshafer, supra note 15, at 125-32 (examining and opining
changes that should be made to financially protect inexperienced and non-elite
professional athletes); Herbert, supra note 16, at 275-76 (proposing remedies such
as amending WCS and prohibiting teams from providing medical care); Schaffer,
supra note 67, at 650-54 (recommending all legislatures should include profes-
sional athletes in WCS and eliminate set-off WCS).
206. See Redlingshafer, supra note 15, at 125-32 (recommending athletes be
allowed to sue team physicians for medical malpractice and legislatures should
include professional athletes in WCS).
207. See id. at 102-05 (exemplifying predicament by retelling story of Greg
Lotysz, who suffered injury early in his second season with New York Jets, and
comparing Lotsyz's struggle with those of Jacksonville Jaguars Offensive Lineman
Jeff Novak).
Greg [Lotysz] claims his knee has only gotten worse, and he contin-
ues his fight not only for his family, but for a lot of guys who've played
pro sports. Despite the dedication, Greg's struggle was not needed for
other former athletes who have had their careers ended because of faulty
medical treatment. On August 6, 2002, a former offensive lineman for
the Jacksonville Jaguars, Jeff Novak, accepted a settlement in his medical
malpractice lawsuit against a former team doctor. Novak received $2 mil-
lion in the settlement, after ajudge threw out his $5.35 million judgment.
He had suffered a bone bruise in 1998, and in a story eerily similar to
Greg's, claimed infections that stemmed from the improper treatment of
the bruise ended his career.
Id. at 104-05 (footnotes and quotations omitted).
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the buzzer. For some, such as Jayson Williams, it has been. 20°  But
for the non-elite inexperienced professional athletes, it usually
comes up just short.20 9
Diana P. Cortes
208. Contra Rovell, supra note 7, 6 (speculating about Williams's future legal
problems regarding his insurance policy and his current attempt to return to pro-
fessional basketball).
209. See, e.g., Redlingshafer, supra note 15, at 102-05 (retelling Greg Lotysz
story and how severe injury prematurely ended his career). "Due to the limited
service Greg served in the NFL, he is not eligible for most of the benefits provided
through the union and the collective bargaining agreement, but is eligible for
Workers' Compensation, reimbursement of medical and rehabilitation expenses,
and disability." Id. at 103.
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